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What Can We Learn from the Implementation of the Automated 
Baggage-Handling System at the Denver International Airport? 
Ramiro Montealegre 
University of Colorado, Boulder 
Abstract 
Most analyses about risk in implementing large-scale information technology have tended to focus on 
discrete outcomes and to draw boundaries which often fail to capture important social relationships. It is 
argued here that the risk of failure needs to be interpreted operationally, not just as inherent in certain 
structural features of the environment or of a project, but also as arising from distinct human and 
organizational practices and patterns of belief and action. The emphasis is on the mutual influence between 
the large-scale information technology, the context in which it is being embedded, and the process of its 
implementation. Drawing on the rich data of the implementation of an automated baggage-handling system 
at the Denver International Airport, this presentation aims to foster discussion about risks associated with 
the implementation of large-scale information technology systems.  
The purpose of this presentation is to foster discussion about risks associated with the implementation of 
large-scale information technology (IT) systems. Clearly the implementation of large-scale IT systems is 
risky, and the current risk literature is replete with description of things that can go wrong. The existing 
literature has identified risk factors and models which tend to share three characteristics. First, they consist 
of causal models based on the deterministic assumptions of either a technological or organizational 
imperative (Markus and Robey, 1988), therefore discount the importance of human intentions and action in 
shaping the implementation of technology. Second, they are variance models (Markus and Robey, 1988) 
that do not adequately capture the contextual and processual issues that are fundamental to examining 
implementation risks (Pettigrew, 1990; Sauer 1993). Third, they focus primarily on large scale IT system 
prior to implementation that do not examine the dynamic implementation process (Willcocks and Griffith 
1994).  
In this presentation, the history of the Denver International Airport (DIA) project and the evolution of the 
automated baggage-handling system implementation will be examined, looking beyond the system 
boundaries to understand how they influence, and were influenced by, the social setting in which they were 
embedded. The data for this presentation will be drawn from a historical and longitudinal study, involving 
contact with the managers and workers associated with the project to enable the documentation of the 
organizational change initiatives that extended over a twelve-year time frame (1983-1995). The preliminary 
findings of the study suggest that attention should be shifted away from identifying the increasing number 
of isolated antecedents of risk, and instead toward examining the changes in patterns of risk over time. This 
paper argues that the implementation of large IT systems should be conceptualized not as having static risk 
but a dynamic risk. Such a perspective allows us to anticipate, explain, and evaluate different risks and their 
consequences during the implementation of large-scale IT systems.  
The overall context of the DIA project is characterized by the dynamic nature of the development of a new 
airport, the economic and political environment, the large number of parties involved, the severe time 
constraints for completion, and the one-time nature of the project. In addition, communication and debate at 
the various management levels and among subcontractors was not encouraged or facilitated, in keeping 
with the strong emphasis on product and deadlines that characterized the fast-track nature of the project. 
Within this context, the initial vision for a baggage-handling system at DIA was that each individual airline 
should build its own system. In June 1991, United Airlines signed on to use DIA as its second-largest hub 
airport. In order to turn aircraft around in under thirty minutes, United insisted on having an automated 
baggage handling system. In December 1991, they commissioned BAE Automatic Systems, Inc., a world 
leader in the design and implementation of material handling systems, to develop an automated system 
concept for their Concourse B. Airlines other than United, however, were not coming forward with plans to 
develop their own baggage systems.  
Two years into the construction of the new airport, a vision began to emerge for the inclusion of an airport-
wide integrated baggage-handling system that could provide a major improvement in the efficiency of 
luggage delivery. It was expected that such efficiency would be reflected on saving precious ground time, 
reducing close-out time for hub operations, and cutting back on time-consuming manual baggage sorting 
and handling. Since BAE was already working on United's automated system and recognizing its strong 
world-wide reputation as a baggage system builder, Denver approached BAE. The planning and negotiation 
for the implementation of this system was driven directly from the top by managers with no intimate 
knowledge of the baggage system technology and by consultants hired to develop the system specification 
but with no responsibility for monitoring the implementation. This emergent view, however, 
underestimated the high complexity of the expanded system, the newness of the technology, and the high 
level of coordination required among the entities housed at DIA that were to be served by the system. The 
management team never perceived the baggage-handling system as determining the economical survival of 
the project in any significant way, especially once the settlements with BAE took place. Furthermore, 
although the requirements for the system were expanded from one airline, United Airlines, to serve the 
whole airport, the managerial structures merely replicated past practices. The managerial team failed to 
redefine the system implementation in relation to its new context. They failed to link the interconnected 
knowledge base and expertise required for the implementation, and to assure consistency between the 
technology and the context.  
Over time as changes in the context and in various internal components of the DIA project took place, and 
the technology began to experience problems related to its newness, management was caught without the 
tools, time, or structures to facilitate the required changes in operational processes. As the pressure grew, 
different views began to appear which resulted in open conflict. The process of interaction between the 
management team, the system development contractor, and the airlines involved a clash of perspectives. 
There is no evidence, however, that management sought clarification or that it fully understood the 
magnitude of the problem until the opening of the new airport had to be postponed. After delaying the 
opening of the new airport three times, the plans for the systems were scaled down from an airport-wide 
system to a single baggage-handling system for each concourse. During this stage, however, the system 
implementation management team (now consisting of United Airlines, an airport technology consultant 
firm, and BAE) facilitated desired changes in this area by sensitive management of the process of change, 
such as encouraging the extensive dialogue needed between interested parties. Appropriate efforts were 
made at the various managerial levels involved to avoid problems of coordination. The implementation of 
the IT system was consciously monitored allowing management to refresh and adapt the strategy for 
change over time. Six months after the de-scaling of the system, the airport was able to open and operate 
successfully.  
Consistent with prior research on the implementation risk literature, ambiguity in the implementation of 
large-scale IT systems is inevitable due to such factors as the need to ensure agreement among diverse 
parties, the uncertainty in the organization's technology and environment, the multiple perspectives of 
different individuals and groups, and the lack of information about the various components that could be 
affected by large-scale system. No one manager is likely to have the competence to evaluate critically and 
in depth all the components that could potentially affect or be affected by the implementation of a new 
large-scale IT system. On the other hand, the responsibility for the implementation, with respect to the 
process of organizational change in combination with large scale, can easily fall into the gap between 
system developers and managers since both groups can assume a role for themselves that assigns 
responsibility to the other party.  
The process of organization change surrounding the implementation of the baggage-handling system at 
DIA involved new ways of working, managing, and thinking (Nadler and Tushman, 1989; Hoffman, 1989; 
Henderson, 1992). In every stage of systems implementation, distinctive transformations of either the 
technology or the organization, or both, took place. In all cases, however, the changes that took place 
provided a new context for later systems implementations (Applegate, 1993; Argyris, 1990; Beer, et al., 
1990; Hoffman, 1989; Kanter, 1992; Kelly and Amburgey, 1991; Mohrman, 1989). The DIA management 
group struggled over time to achieve alignment between the changes that were taking place in the overall 
project and the operation of systems that were being implemented. Management failed in its role of creating 
an environment of understanding between the various stakeholders involved. These stakeholders who were 
the potential users of the system and the system developers were neither homogeneous nor static in time, 
but were broadly incompatible with the overall strategy of implementing a large-scale IT system with 
unknown technology (a very dynamic part of the project) within the rigid time constraints.  
This research is useful in describing (in one specific setting) the patterns of technological and 
organizational change which reflect the properties of the social setting in which a large-scale system is 
being implemented. An understanding of these issues is central to an explanation of the risks associated 
with the failure of large-scale IT system implementation, and central to the detection of potential sources of 
conflict in a specific social context.  
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